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Abstract
The climate change is well known as global public goods. Provision of global 
public goods is likely to convey market and government failures in the global 
community. The global community should prevent these failures from 
transforming into complicated issues. In the Paris Agreement adopted in COP 
21, 2015 each member country should announce voluntarily the target to 
reduce the emission of the greenhouse gases.
We construct the integrated scheme for the global climate change issues. In 
the firm structure of agreement each participant of this scheme should owe 
the obligation to be attained. Markets of emission trading could be designed to 
be an effective option for the purposes and should be improved in the practical 
experiences positively. Many governments have promoted policies to innovate 
environmental technology for another purpose of generating energy efficiently. 
By developing the integrated theoretical model of global community, we can 
expect to manage the efficiently constructed mechanism with the green 
innovation and the scheme of emission trading market. In this paper, we make 
a method to investigate the social impact of emission trading market on the 
global community. The impact analysis will enforce the driving power to guide 
the global community into the effective mechanism to reduce greenhouse 
gases.
Key words: the Paris Agreement, market of emission trading, innovation of 
environmental technology, redistribution of funds for investment, global 
community.
1. Introduction
In the globally accepted view, the programs to decrease greenhouse gases in 
the Kyoto Scheme should be reconstructed in the second commitment period, 
2013-2020. It is expected that the series of conventions such as the Paris 
1) This paper is produced in English to develop Tanaka (2013) written in Japanese.
8
Chapter 2　Innovation of Green Technology, Redistribution of Global Investment Funds and Emission Trading 
in the Paris Agreement Scheme of Climate Change
Agreement in COP 21 could establish the appropriate mechanism after 2020 to 
mitigate climate change problems. Regarding the main discussing point in this 
research papers, the problems of the climate change do not only need to 
improve solubility of imperative problems in the global community beyond the 
framework of states, but also require the local community to solve the inherent 
issues. The climate change problems involve many local issues. The local 
community is obliged to confront with the inherent regional issues but should 
not dedicate only to the own region. Even if a single local community came to 
the dead lock, the global community could reach to find out clues to the 
problems with a cooperation of members. The increasing social needs in the 
local communities have appeared globally as the common phenomena. The 
social needs that could not be satisfied in the local community flow out into the 
issues of the global community. Consequently, the global community becomes 
to face the increasing social needs. Some local issues could be improved by the 
efficient support of the global community. The global community usually seems 
to be an imaginary and abstract subject, but should be organized according to 
various social needs. The global community sometimes might appear to be only 
responsible entity for global issues. But it has not obtained the same controlling 
functions as the state and could be authorized in a limited range of 
enforcements of regulation. The social and economic system of the global 
community is managed by the competitive and cooperative mechanism that is 
dominated by voluntary methods.
The global community provides public goods voluntary. The voluntary 
provision of global public goods that depends on the international agreement is 
influenced by the interests of many players participating the negotiation. The 
interests depend deeply on the estimated values of the future environments. 
The various participants and the uncertain estimation on the future might 
make the prospect of the goal out of the negotiation unclear. To show the way 
out from the present confusion, we should make clear the interrelation among 
innovation of environmental technology, the fund raising system for the 
investment and voluntary contribution for climate change issues. The funds 
raising scheme turns the innovation into real investment for the green 
economy.
Tanaka (2016) argues that the market and government failures might cause 
bottleneck in the global public goods and that the dead weight loss in the global 
market should be shared by the all members of the community. Tanaka (2016) 
suggests the appropriate and diverse rate of burden for each country according 
to concern with the bottleneck.
Although the distribution of the contributions to reduce the greenhouse 
gases is decided principally by political arrangements, actually the voluntary 
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approach is expected to support a large part of contributions in the framework 
of the Paris Agreement. The voluntary approach is managed and operated by 
private economy and residents. The voluntary approach is controlled not only 
by costs and benefits based on the market mechanism but also social impacts 
on the global and local communities.
The environmental economics provides the theoretical foundations that the 
emission trading could activate efficient market mechanism and achieve the 
targeted reduction of the target effectively. We argue in this paper that the 
emission trading among local communities or states could propel voluntary 
contributions to reduce greenhouse gases in social and economic activities 
effectively. In particular, the markets of emission trading make effects on the 
inter states redistribution of funds for green investments. The transfer of fund 
could promote innovation for the environmental technology in the global 
community.
By the theoretical framework with market of emission trading, we could 
analyze the climate change issues such as the scheme of voluntary contribution, 
the innovation for the environmental technology, the transfer of the funds for 
green economy and the social cost sharing for climate change in a single 
integrated theoretical model.
It is assumed in this paper that one country announces publicly the own 
target to reduce the gases but might not owe the obligation to achieve it. 
Whether obligations are defined or not, the governments must pursue the 
feasible program to reduce the gases in the future. The market solution is 
constructed to correct the welfare loss in the demand and control. If the 
system of the market supports to achieve the target to reduce the gases 
effectively, each government might make a more positive decision to reduce 
the gases.
If many governments share an optimistic view to achieve the targets, the 
international negotiation for reducing the gases could make a great progress 
cooperatively. Unfortunately, some great disasters caused by the climate 
change might suffer people diversely in many regions. If the critical expectation 
prevails, the effective program to prevent crisis should be argued seriously on 
the negotiation processes. As a result, a positive agreement will be likely to be 
available with the intensive discussion.
Recently, coping with the economic development in the global scale, many 
countries intend to acquire a low price and a large amount of energy 
sustainably. Many governments promote policies to innovate environmental 
technology generating energy efficiently. The social impact of emission trading 
could evaluate the main obstacles to lead us to the profitable agreement for the 
inhabitants in the future generations on the earth. The participants in the 
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market would trade voluntarily the emission permits by their own expectations. 
The uncertainties caused by innovations in environmental technology and 
developments of economies have a possibility to influence the target aimed to 
be achieved2) and the scheme itself. Tanaka (1998) analyzed the efficient scheme 
of emission trading by using the cost benefit approach presented by Yohe 
(1998). Tanaka and Hasegawa (2003) developed the analysis in the uncertain 
situation by using a sensitive analysis of the cost benefits. As a method of 
social impact approaches3) on emission trading prevails the significant meaning 
of the Paris Agreement, this paper makes clear the prospects of the scheme to 
be performed globally. Tanaka (2008) argues that the properties of intensities 
of energy and carbon should become effective signal toward the low carbon 
community.
This paper is constructed as follows. In the section 2, a two countries model 
is formulated to analyze the negotiation to reduce the gases in the frame work 
of the Kyoto Mechanism. The model of the two countries expresses the 
following assumptions. The country one obtains the responsibility to reduce the 
gases. The country 2 dose not owe the obligation of reduction at the present 
but is possible to accept the obligation by the result of international negotiation 
to reduce the emission of the gases. This model has the implication that the 
social impact of the market scheme induced by the cap to reduce the gases 
depend on the improvement of the technology and the scale of caps. The 
section 3 discusses the main points in the Scheme of the Paris Agreement. In 
particular, if the countries which owed obligation to reduce the gases are 
allocated the suitable amount of emission permits, we could construct a 
management rule of the emission trading market under the uncertainty 
regarding the progress of the environmental technology.
We summarize the 7 main results in this paper as following. 1. The 
improvement of technology decreasing emission of greenhouse gases in the 
country 1 increases the surplus of emission trading for the country 1 but 
declines the surplus in the country 2 from emission trading. 2. On the contrary, 
the improvement of technology decreasing greenhouse gases in the country 2 
enhances the surplus of emission trading in both countries. 3. In the case that 
the requirement for the county 1 to reduce emission of the gases is greater to 
some extent than the one for the country 2, the enlargement of the regulation 
cap for the county 1 increases the surplus of the both countries from using the 
emission trading. The increase in the regulation cap for the country 2 
2) Ellerman et al (2007) and Burney (2010) survey theoretically the some related problems with emis-
sion trading.
3) Epstein and Yuthas (2014) discuss the implication and the management of social impacts.
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decreases the surplus of the country 1 to use the emission trading. To initiate 
the emission regulation for the county 2 implies that the relative obligation of 
the country 1 is lowering and that the country 1 could attain the reduction 
target with the lesser emission permits. 4. When the regulation for the country 
1 enlarges, the country 2 becomes more sensitive to join the market of the 
emission trading. To enforce the regulation for the county 2 shrinks the surplus 
on the own country market.
We consider the case that a large scale of uncertainty prevails in the 
following cases 5-7. 5. The country 1 can obtain net benefit from the market of 
emission trading. 6. If the regulation cap for the country 2 increases in 
comparing with the counterpart of the country 1, the country 2 is possibly to 
receive a negative benefit from the market of emission trading. 7. If the 
requirement of regulation for the country 1 is stated in the large enough level, 
both countries can obtain a positive expected benefit from the market of 
emission trading. Although the uncertainty regarding the agreement from the 
negotiation does not disappear, the market of emission trading could pave the 
way toward the agreement with the obligation to be achieved.
2. Two Countries Model Analysis in the Framework of Kyoto Protocol
2-1. A Model Analysis on the International Negotiation on the Climate Change
In the framework of Paris Agreement for the climate change, some counties 
declare the targets to reduce the greenhouse gases. Others do not have targets 
nor obligations for reducing gases but should declare the efforts to contribute 
for the climate change problems. Some countries might not ratify the 
agreement officially and remain as outside member of the agreement. Although 
some types of approach to decrease greenhouse gases are available, we must 
construct a comprehensive management system to mitigate problems of the 
climate change.
In this paper we provide the theoretical foundation to reform international 
framework to reduce the emission of the gases. To simplify the analysis, we 
make clear the assumptions about the model as follows. The countries in the 
world are classified into two types. The country 1 obtains the obligation to 
reduce the gases according to the publicly announced target. The country 2 is 
not required to take any obligation to reduce the gases in the frame work of 
the agreement4).
In the first, in this model analysis the country 1 is assumed to be required to 
reduce the greenhouse gases by e but the country 2 is supposed to owe no 
4) Many arguments focus on the Post Kyoto framework. For example, Aldy and Stavins (2007) sur-
vey the main subjects on this topic comprehensively.
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regulation for emitting the green gases. In the Paris Agreement the country 1 
could decide e voluntary, but neighboring countries evaluate the value of e 
critically. The variable e is assumed to be exogenous in this model. This paper 
investigates the mechanism that both country 1 and 2 reduce the emission of 
the gases cooperatively. We present a popular approach of the cost benefit 
analysis by Figure1. Figure 1 is depicted as follows. The emission of the gases 
is measured along the horizontal axis. When the country 1 moves to the right, 
the country emits more the gases. On the contrary, reducing the emission of 
the gases moves the country 1 to the leftward. The reducing the emission of 
the gases in the country 2 is expressed by the movement from the left to the 
right. The benefits and the costs to increase or to decrease emission of the 
greenhouse gases are indicated along the vertical axis. The largest possible 
emission amount for the country 1 is expressed by the length of Q1H. As the 
country 1 increases the reduction of the gases, the efforts to reduce the gases 
Figure 1. The country 1 is required to reduce the greenhouse gases unilaterally.
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are represented by traveling to the left on the marginal cost curve BH. The 
curve EI shows the marginal reducing cost of the country 2. The movement 
from the start point E to the right shows the increasing marginal cost of 
reduction. The curves HB and EI are increasing marginal costs and have 
slopes -b1 and b2 to indicate the efficiency of decrement of the gases for the 
both countries.
It is supposed that the country 1 accepts the e units of reduction of emission. 
The market of emission trading lowers the burden on the country 1 from the 
area of the triangle CEH, to achieve the target without the market, into the 
summation of the area of the triangle GFH and the area of rectangular DEFG 
that expresses the cost of purchasing the emission permits in the market. The 
net payoff of the country 2 from the market is the area of the triangle DEG by 
deducting the cost to reduce the emission in the country 2 from revenue of 
selling the permits.
Without the market the country 1 must pay the cost to be equal to the area 
of the triangle CEH. But the country 2 must finance the fund of the area of 
triangle EFG to initiate the project to reduce the gases. If the country 2 fails to 
finance the cost of the reduction, the country could not join the framework of 
the Paris Agreement. The joint reduction of the gases by the both countries 
should be founded by the mechanism of sharing reduction costs. Some options 
of sharing the cost are available for the both countries. The country 1 could 
offer the country 2 the actual cost of reduction shown by the area of triangle 
EFG and the surplus A2. But the required reduction cost for the country 2 is 
indicated by the area of triangle EFG. The process of the negotiation in the 
Paris Agreement should focus on the incidence of the surplus A2. In particular, 
the financial support of the country 1 for the country 2 is expected to be 
effective to reduce the greenhouse gases globally. But the negotiations in the 
global community could not prospect the optimal results. As many complicated 
factors may influence the results, we should analyze the process of negotiation 
more closely.
The establishment of the market of emission trading organized by many 
members of the Paris Agreement is supposed to lead the negotiation to the 
suitable aim. Actually, the market cannot work completely, the allocation of the 
surpluses is determined not by the theoretical reasoning but by the negotiation 
powers of the both countries. But the theoretical analysis indicates that 
regulation regarding emission of the gases and improvement of the technology 
to reduce the climate change state the feature of the market. The alterations 
of the above factors make influence on the negotiation structure of member 
countries and might move into another trading solution by facilitating the 
cooperative managements system for the problems of the climate change.
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The equilibrium of the emission trading market equalizes the marginal costs 
to reduce emission of the gases for the two countries and is represented by the 
point G. The price and the quantity in the market equilibrium are presented by 
p and x. The country 1 gains the surplus A1 from the market of emission 
trading to be equal to the area of the triangle CDG. The surplus of the country 
2 from emission trading is denoted by A2 and expressed by the area of the 
triangle DEG precisely. The equilibrating condition of marginal costs for the 
both counties is expressed by the equality,
  b2x = b1 (e - x).
Transforming the above equality, the market quantity and the market price 
are stated by
  x = 
b1e 
b1 + b2
,    (1)
  p = 
b1b2e 
b1 + b2
.    (2)
The progress in the technology to reduce emission of the greenhouse gases 
is supposed to bring a new effect on the decrement of the marginal cost in the 
Figure 1. The effect implies to lower the coefficients b1 and b2. By differentiat-
ing (2) with b1 and b2, we make assure the signs obtained in (3) and (4).
  
∂p
 
∂b1
 = 
eb2
2
 
(b1 + b2)
2 > 0.   (3)
  
∂p
 
∂b2
 = 
eb1
2
 
(b1 + b2)
2 > 0.   (4)
The expressions of (3) and (4) imply that the progress of the technology to 
reduce emission of the greenhouse gases in the both countries lowers the 
market prices. Similarly, the differentiation with e expresses,
  
∂p
 
∂e  = 
b1b2 
b1 + b2
 > 0.   (5)
The above expression (5) describes that the enforcement of regulation to re-
duce the emission of the gases raises the market price of emission trading. We 
could make certain the positive correlation between the price and the regula-
tion cap in the market of emission trading by the mathematical formula. The 
market price evaluates to reduce the emission of the gases. The expression (5) 
implies that the enforcement of regulation enhances the caution for the prob-
lems of the climate change. The expressions (3) and (4) mean that revolution of 
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the technology regarding emission of the gases mitigates the critical situation 
of the climate change. The finance to improve the technology is the issue to be 
argued in the following section.
2-2. Social Welfare Analysis and the Market of Emission Trading
The motivations for the participants to use the market are influenced by their 
surpluses of the emission trading. The larger the surplus becomes, the more 
profit the two countries could obtain. The surplus could be funded on the 
technological revolution to reduce the emission of the gases. The investment 
financed by the surplus is expected to become the main contributing factor to 
the problems of climate change. This section makes sure the mechanism by 
the market to increase the investment for the problems of the climate change. 
The surplus is a significant index for the two countries to gain their own 
merits in the market of emission trading. We could evaluate the surpluses of 
the two countries by the areas of the triangles as the following expressions (6), 
(7) and (8).
  A1 = 
e2b1
3
 
2 (b1 + b2)
2 .   (6)
  A2 = 
e2b1
2b2 
2 (b1 + b2)
2 .   (7)
  A1 + A2 = 
b1
2e2
 
2 (b1 + b2)
.   (8)
The regulation cap e on the emission of the greenhouse gases has been 
discussed in one of the significant subjects on the conventions of the climate 
change. The innovation in the environmental technology might offer the newly 
available choices for the agreement. The suitably composed combination 
between the innovation of environmental technology and the emission trading 
is expected to be an effective harness to make the negotiation of the climate 
change forward.
This section makes confirm the above reasoning in the theoretical 
framework. The innovation of environmental technology is brought by fiery 
competitions in various fields. If the competition promotes the efficient 
reduction of the greenhouse gases, the agreements in the multinational 
negotiation of the climate change are influenced by the results of the 
competition among many technologies. The globally spreading emission trading 
seems to be connected with the innovations deeply. Tanaka (2012) proposes the 
effective policy index to support the reduction of the greenhouse gases by 
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using competitive market mechanism. To analyze the relation between the 
innovation and the activation of the emission trading, the surpluses of each 
countries A1 and A2 are differentiated by b1 and b2 indicating efficiencies to 
reduce the emission.5) Since the country 1 is expected to be obliged to 
contribute greater reduction in the emission of the gases than the country 2, 
the former is assumed to employ a higher efficient technology of cost than the 
latter. This relation is assumed to be expressed by the inequality, b1 < b2.
  
∂A1 
∂b1
 = 
e2b1
3 (b1 - 3b2) 
2 (b1 + b2)
3  < 0.  (9)
  
∂A1 
∂b2
 = 
e2b1
3
 
(b1 + b2)
3 < 0.   (10)
  
∂A2 
∂b1
 = 
e2b1b2
2
 
(b1 + b2)
3 > 0.   (11)
  
∂A2 
∂b2
 = 
e b1 (b1 - b2) 
2 (b1 + b2)
3  < 0.   (12)
The above inequalities imply that the revolution of environmental technology 
in one country influences differently on the surpluses of the two countries. The 
negative sign in (9) and (10) implies that the revolutions of environmental 
technology in the both countries increase the surpluses of the country 1. The 
market change to decrease b1 shifts the equilibrium point G in the Figure 1. 
The leftward rotation of the curve BH around the point B moves the market 
price lower greatly but declines the quantity slightly. Lowing b2 rotates the 
curve EI rightward around the point E. The changes increase A1. The 
expression (9) means downing price and decreasing quantity. The expression 
(10) states that the price decreases and the quantity enhances in the market 
change. In particular, the improvement of technology in the country 2 raises 
the surplus A1. The investment to induce the innovation on the emission of the 
green house gases in the country 2 could be supported by the technologies and 
funds of country 2 and the emission trading market could facilitate investment 
from the country 1. By using the emission trading the country 1 is encouraged 
to invest the revolutions of environmental technology in the both countries. 
The positive and the negative signs in (11) and (12) mean that the surplus of 
the country 2 is decreased by the revolution of technology in the country 1 but 
5) Tanaka (2010a), (2010b) argue the theoretical approach on the problems of the climate change and 
revolution of environmental technology.
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increased by the achievement of revolution in the country 2. The surplus of the 
country 2 is decreased by the investment on the technology in the country 1 
but is raised by the innovation in the country 2. The investment on the country 
2 increases the relative advantage of the country 2 in the emission trading 
market but the investment on the country 1 declines the advantage. In the 
situation that the investment on the country 1 executes fine achievements on 
the target of reducing the emission of the gases, the country 2 declines the 
profit or the incentive to enter the emission trading market. The development 
of the emission trading market requires sufficient investment to reduce 
emission of the green house gases in the initiation.
The country 1 that owes the obligation to reduce the gases endeavors 
positively the technology revolution with the support of the emission permit 
market in the both countries. The transaction in the globally organized 
emission permit market involves the transfer of the funds from the country 1 
to the country 2. The country 2 without obligation to reduce emission of the 
gases could not obtain a positive benefit by investment on the country 1. The 
country 2 needs more funds from the global community according to the Paris 
Agreement.
In this paper the coefficients b1 and b2 express the cost to reduce one unit of 
the greenhouse gases. Kolstad6) argues the effectiveness of intensity analysis 
such as energy intensity and carbon intensity in the dynamical and uncertain 
process. We make clear that the fund for investment could be financed in the 
emission trading could be under the value of the surplus exhibited by the 
coefficients b1, b2 and e. Consequently, this paper suggests the effective policies 
that could remove the obstacles on the appropriate cooperation on the 
international conventions of climate change in a large part.
3. Structural Analysis on the Paris Agreement Scheme
3-1. Regulation of Reduction on the Country 2
In 2008, G8 at Toyako Summit declared the official target to reduce emission of 
the greenhouse gases 50% by 2050. To achieve the medium or the long term 
target, the international conventions will confirm the structure of the Paris 
Agreement Scheme.
In the process of the agreement the discussion focuses on the regulation of 
emission for the countries that have not obtained obligation of reducing the 
gases. Although the agreement cannot establish the regulation officially, the 
methods of the market should contain the contract with the credit. The 
expectation on the revolution of environmental technology might also have the 
6) Refer the chapter 7 of Hansjürgens (2005).
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influence on the process to achieve the agreement. This section discusses the 
additional regulation e2 for the country 2 and the uncertainty about the 
revolution of the environmental technology.
We replace Figure 1 by Figure 2 to consider the structure of the Paris 
Agreement Scheme suitably. To improve the effect to reduce emission of the 
greenhouse gases globally we should facilitate the regulation. It is assumed that 
the regulated amount is less than the transaction quantity (e2 < x). The country 
2 must pay the cost to reduce the emission expressed by the area of the 
triangle JEK (T2). The surplus of the country 1 and country 2 are A1
p indicated 
by the area of the triangle CDG and A2
p (the area of the triangle DJG). The 
surpluses obtained by the both countries are equal to the expressions (13), (15) 
by calculating the net benefit from the emission trading.
Figure 2. The additional regulation for the country 2.
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  A1
p = 
b1 
2
  
eb1 - e2 (b1 + b2) 
b1 + b2
 
2
.  (13)
  A2
p = 
b2 
2   
eb1 - e2 (b1 + b2) 
b1 + b2
 
2
.  (14)
  A2
p - T2 = b1b2e 
b1e - 2 (b1 + b2)e2 
2 (b1 + b2)
2 . (15)
In the next, we investigate the effects that regulations e and e2 affect the 
surpluses of the both countries. If the condition eb1 > e2 (b1 + b2) is satisfied, the 
different signs of surplus on the country 1 are assured by noticing (16) and (17).
  
∂A1
p
 
∂e  = 
b1
2 {eb1 - e2 (b1 + b2)} 
(b1 + b2)
2  > 0.  (16)
  
∂A1
p
 
∂e2
 = 
b1 {eb1 - e2 (b1 + b2)} 
(b1 + b2)
 < 0.  (17)
It is supposed that the regulation for the country 1 is more strict for the 
country 2. As the regulation e is raised, the surplus obtained by the country 1 
from the market of emission permit increases. The higher regulation the 
country 2 confronts, the lower the surplus of the county 1 from the emission 
trading becomes. In this case the motivation for the country 1 to use the 
market of the emission permit is supposed to decline. The contribution by the 
country 1 to reduce the emission is shared by the country 2. The country 1 
could raise more fund to invest on the reduction of the gases by the enhancing 
regulation of own country, but the increasing regulation of the country 2 
lowers the investment in the country 1. The various regulations of emission 
permit promote the dispersion of investment on reducing emission between the 
both countries.
The relation between the surplus of the country 2 from the emission trading 
and the regulations for the both countries are stated the signs of the 
expressions (18) and (19). If the inequality
  e > 
(b1 + b2)e2 
b1
is supposed to be satisfied, we obtain the expressions (18) and (19).
  
∂ (A2
p - T2) 
∂e  = b1b2 
b1e - (b1 + b2)e2 
(b1 + b2)
2  > 0. (18)
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  ∂ (A2
p - T2) 
∂e2
 = - 
b1b2e 
b1 + b2
 < 0.   (19)
The above inequalities state that the uprising total regulation increases the 
motivation for the country 2 to participate the emission trading and that the 
increased regulation on the country 2 curtails the motivation of this country. 
The enforcement of regulation that a large number of countries to reduce 
emission of green house gases compensates the emission trading.
3-2. Progress of Technologies and Regulation on the Emission
Principally, the emission market is based on the voluntary participation of each 
country. The surplus analysis makes clear the motivation of each country to 
participate the emission trading and sources of investments. The surplus 
depends on the progress determined by the improvement of environmental 
technologies and the regulations on the emission. However, the progress is 
supported by successful achievements in many fields of technology and 
demands a large amount of funds. The investment on the revolution of 
technology requires a large scale of funds but could not necessarily lead to the 
success for the business. The innovation of technology could not be achieved 
without the severe competitions.
The uncertainty on the revolution of environmental technology appears a 
dark shadow in front of the international negotiation of the climate change. The 
traditional approach for the uncertainty supposes the set of the more and the 
less successful contingents of technology evolution for the both counties (b1
1, b2
1) 
and (b1
0, b2
0). The probabilities to occur the two events are denoted by π and 1-π. 
Mathematically, the following inequalities are supposed,
  b1
1 < b2
1, b1
0 < b2
0, b1
1 < b1
0, b2
1 < b2
0.
The expected net benefits for both countries from the emission market E 
(A1
p) and E (A2
p - T) are stated by the expressions (20) and (21).
  E (A1
p) = 
1
 
2   πb1
1 ( b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 e - e2)2 + (1 - π) b10 ( b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 e - e2)2  . (20)
  E (A2
p - T) = 
 
1
 
2    
πb1
1b2
1e
 
b1
1 + b2
1 ( b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 e - 2e2) + (1 - π) b1
0b2
0e
 
b1
0 + b2
0 ( b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 e - 2e2)  . (21)
Since the sign of (20) is non negative, the country 1 could gain the expected net 
benefit from the market of emission permit under uncertainty. However, the 
incentive for the country 1 to use the scheme of the markets depends on the 
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values, 
e2 
e
, 
b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 , 
b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 , πb1
1, (1 - π)b1
0. By reminding that the expression 
(20) is transformed to
  E (A1
p) = 
e2
 
2   πb1
1 ( b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 - 
e2 
e )
2
 + (1 - π)b1
0 ( b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 - 
e2 
e )
2
  . (22)
In the right hand of (22), the first term implies that enhancing the target to 
reduce the emission in the global community makes the market trading in the 
country 1 more profitable. The innovation of green technology could not perform 
the excellent achievement, at least one of b1
1, b1
0 is kept in high level. Suppose that 
the regulation of the country 2, e2 is kept in approximately zero and that 
b1
1 ( b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 - 
e2 
e ) 2 or b10 (
b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 - 
e2 
e ) 2 remains in significant values. In the 
situation, the expected net benefit of the market trading involves investment to 
decrease emission of the gases.
To the contrary, the previous values on b1
1 ( b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 - 
e2 
e ) 2 and b10 (
b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0 - 
e2 
e ) 2 
approximate to zero, the expected value is too small to prompt any investment. 
That is the market is effective in the limited range.
It is supposed that the regulation for the country 2 e2 enlarges. When the 
condition
  2
e2 
e  > max   
b1
1
 
b1
1 + b2
1 , 
b1
0
 
b1
0 + b2
0  
is satisfied, the expected net benefit expressed by (21) is more likely to be neg-
ative. It implies the following case. As the regulation for the country 2 increas-
es beyond the extent, this country would change the position from the supplier 
to the demander in the emission market. Around the turning point the country 
2 loses motivation to utilize the market of emission. After the stage the coun-
try 2 has the same incentive as the country 1. The country 2 is the subject of 
analysis by using not (21) but (20). Since (20) and (21) are the quadratic forms 
mathematically, the values are positive for the sufficiently large e. In the range 
of values, the both countries evaluate the positive net benefit of the emission 
market. After the regulations for the two counties reach a sufficiently large 
range appropriately, the emission market plays the effective method for solving 
the problems of the climate change.
The governmental supports could make a significant effect on the evolution 
of technology. Although the market policies of the government skew the 
efficient allocation of the market mechanism and deteriorate the budget deficit, 
the positive policies to support environmental innovation seek for raising the 
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probability π to achieve the progress in the environmental revolution. The 
effective polices to promote environmental innovation are stated by (20). 
Reminding that the first term in (20) is the product of πb1
1 and 
eb1
1
 
(b1
1 + b2
1)2
 - e2, 
the uprising probability supported by the government keeps πb1
1 in a high 
value and increases 
eb1
1
 
(b1
1 + b2
1)2
 - e2 by lowering (b1
1 + b2
1)2. In this circumstance, 
the demand of the country 1 to use the emission market is increasing7). The 
expression (20) explains that the prospect of the agreement of the climate 
change depends on the many complicated factors but that the governmental 
positive policies for revolution of environmental technologies and regulations 
for emission of gases are deeply concerned with the growth of the emission 
market8).The theoretical consideration in this paper could evaluate the following 
scenario steadily.
If the country 2 has an effective achievement on decrease of the gases in 
prospect of the progress of environmental technologies, this country could 
facilitate the emission market profitably in the view of cost benefit analysis.9)
In the preceding discussion, the emission trading market could be evaluated 
to be effective method to reduce the green house gases. We should notice the 
three significant implications as the performances of the emission trading 
market. In the first, the serious intension to mitigate the climate change 
problems could be shared in the global community. In the second, the 
governmental policies to promote the technological innovation of the green 
economy could improve the significant effects with the support of the emission 
trading markets. The synergy between governmental innovation on the green 
economy and the emission trading market could make effects in a middle term. 
In the third, when the evolution in the green technology is dominated in the 
uncertain situation, the emission trading market will be possible to promote 
investment on green economy by the enhancing regulation on the emission of 
the gases.
4. Concluding Remarks
To mitigate the problems of the climate change the effective reduction of the 
greenhouse gases is the critical factor for the global community. The 
7) If the values of (20) and (21) remain a sufficiently large, the country would accept the regulation 
with the net benefit.
8) The social innovation strategy for the low carbon society are argued by many authors such as 
Tanaka (2012) and Robert (2013).
9) Tanaka・Hasegawa (2003), pp.85.
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globalizing economies contribute to spread the sources of the emission of 
greenhouse gases in a large area. The enlargement of the market economies 
causes the market failure in the global community pervasively. The coping 
with this type of market failure has been appeared as the chronic problem and 
could be classified as the governmental failure in the global community. The 
enlargement of the economies raises the importance to use the market policies 
in the international coordination of resources and environmental problems. The 
market policies are composed by two types of approaches. One type attempts 
to regulate economic activities to be harmonized with global community. 
Another type is willing to enlarge the role of market to achieve environmental 
and social problems by the incentive mechanism of economy. For example, the 
FIT is widely recognized as the innovative scheme to prevail the renewable 
energy. Although the many market policies are designed increasingly to 
promote innovative and environmental technologies, actually a large amount of 
governmental polies may induce the miss allocation of resources. The emission 
trading is expected to play the significant role of solving government failures. 
In particular, the emission trading is the indispensable method to manage the 
reduction of the green gases globally.
We must promote the revolution of environmental technology and the 
reform of the social structure to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases 
effectively. The two incentive mechanisms of the market and the voluntary 
contribution in the community must work together in the same direction to 
achieve the target with the least social cost. In this paper we recognize that 
the development of the social system could be brought not only by the market 
mechanism but also by the collaborating restructure in the social system. In 
the mechanism to reduce rising emission of green house gases, emission 
trading is likely to be accepted as the market solution. The theoretical 
approach in this paper makes certain that the incentive mechanism of the 
market could improve the social and environmental problems efficiently but 
should be supported by estimating social net benefit of global community.
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